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SUMMARY: This article provides a factual overview of the deplorable human rights
situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). It
shows how the International Criminal Court (ICC) could have jurisdiction over these
crimes. It provides the legal framework for establishing individual criminal liability for
the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. It applies this framework and the legal standards
for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to the facts existing in the DPRK,
as provided by credible sources. It concludes that published facts indicate a reasonable
basis to believe that Kim Jong Il, who controls the DPRK absolutely, is individually
liable for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. It therefore recommends
that the UN Secretary-General launch an investigation into the DPRK situation. Pursuant
to the findings of the investigation, the UN Security Council should refer the DPRK
situation to the ICC or, if necessary to overcome the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction
requirement, create a special tribunal to open an investigation and prosecution of Kim
Jong Il and his cadres.
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I. INTRODUCTION.

As the world focuses on efforts to denuclearize the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), profound human rights abuses persist under the
dictatorship of the DPRK’s leader, Kim Jong Il. This article seeks to demonstrate the
magnitude of these abuses by showing how they constitute crimes against humanity,
genocide, and war crimes and how Kim Jong Il may be criminally liable for them.
Although the goal of resolving the nuclear problem diplomatically is at odds at this time
with the notion of prosecuting Kim Jong Il, it is an idea that must be explored not only
for moral and legal grounds, but also for increasing the arsenal of possible disincentives
to use against the DPRK should the six-party talks fail or should the DPRK fail to abide
by any agreement produced to end its nuclear weapons efforts.2 It is in effect another
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The six parties engaged in negotiations to denuclearize the Korean peninsula are the United States,

D.P.R.K., Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, and Japan. On Sept. 19,
2005, the six parties produced a joint statement, which set forth agreed commitments to achieve the
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. However, it left unresolved
major issues, including timing, implementation, and the D.P.R.K.’s demand for a light-water nuclear
reactor. Within one day after the joint statement, the D.P.R.K. stated that the United States “should not
even dream” that it would dismantle its nuclear weapons before it receives a new nuclear plant, while the
United States stated that the possibility for such a reactor would occur only after complete and verified
dismantlement. Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leave Key Points Open,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005. The six parties met again Nov. [9 –11,] 2005, in Beijing, but no substantive
progress was made. Kelly Olsen, U.S. Calls North Korea ‘Criminal Regime’, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec.
7, 2005. On May 18, 2006, the New York Times reported Pres. Bush was very likely to approve beginning
negotiations on a peace treaty, even while efforts to dismantle the country’s nuclear program are still
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form of United Nations (UN) Security Council sanction to be considered as seriously as
other sanctions, including economic.
This article first provides a factual overview of the deplorable human rights
situation in the DPRK. It then shows how the International Criminal Court (ICC) could
have jurisdiction over these crimes. It provides the legal framework for establishing
individual criminal liability for the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. It applies this
framework and the legal standards for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
to the facts existing in the DPRK, as provided by credible sources. It concludes that
published facts indicate a reasonable basis to believe that Kim Jong Il is individually
liable for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. It therefore recommends
that the UN Secretary-General launch an investigation into the DPRK situation. Pursuant
to the findings of the investigation, the UN Security Council should refer the DPRK
situation to the ICC or create a special tribunal to open an investigation and prosecution
of Kim Jong Il and other members of the DPRK leadership, as appropriate. This article is
not an exhaustive study of all legal and factual arguments; rather it lays a broad
foundation for further action towards the investigation and criminal prosecution of the
DPRK regime.

underway…But he will not do so unless North Korea returns to multinational negotiations over its nuclear
program…” David E. Sanger, U.S. Said to Weigh a New Approach on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2006. Reuters reported, “two senior U.S. officials were very pessimistic about persuading North Korea to
return to the table and said they did not expect any movement until after Bush leaves office, in 2009, at the
earliest.” Carol Giacomo and Steve Holland, U.S. Open to North Korea Treaty Talks, REUTERS, May 18,
2006.
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II. FACTUAL OVERVIEW.

The following provides a factual overview based on credible reports to
demonstrate Kim Jong Il’s control and likely knowledge of human rights abuses that
constitute crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.

A. Kim Jong Il controls the DPRK and knows of crimes carried out by DPRK
authorities.

The DPRK is probably the most controlled, authoritarian regime in the world.
The obedience required of DPRK citizens to the “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il and his
deceased father, “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung, is so extreme that it resembles a religion.3
It is based on “juche ideology” and reflects a unique regime structure.4 “Juche,” which
means self-reliance, was used by Kim Il Sung as the rationale for purging his political
foes.5 Juche ideology elevated Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung to such a level that North
Koreans have drawn parallels from the “Dear Leader” and his father to Jesus Christ and

3

Mike Chinoy, Rare Look Inside North Korea, CABLE NEWS NETWORK, Nov. 20, 2005,

http://search.cnn.com/pages/search.jsp?query+north%20korea.
4

E-mail Interview with Hwang Jang Yop, highest ranking North Korean government defector previously

holding senior posts, e.g. Chairman of the Supreme People’s Congress (Dec. 20, 2005) (on file with
author).
5

KOREA INSTITUTE NATIONAL UNIFICATION (KINU), WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN

NORTH KOREA 7 (2004).

4

God.6 According to the Seoul-based, government-funded Korea Institute for National
Unification (KINU), the “worship” of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il is stipulated in the
Ten Great Principles of Unique Ideology.7 Here we see another analogy to Christianity,
the Ten Commandments. The “Ten Commandments of North Korea” are:
1. Struggle with all your life to paint the entire society with the one color of the
Great Leader Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought.
2. Respect and revere highly and with loyalty the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.
3. Make absolute the authority of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.
4. Accept the Great Leader Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought as your belief and
take the Great Leader’s instructions as your creed.
5. Observe absolutely the principle of unconditional execution in carrying out the
instructions of the Great leader Kim Il Sung.
6. Rally the unity of ideological intellect and revolutionary solidarity around the
Great Leader Kim Il Sung.
6
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Barbara Demick, A Vigil Against Faith in North Korea, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005 (“Choi recalled the
daily recitations of ‘Thank you, Father Kim Il Sung’ required of children. But after studying with
missionaries, she realized the extent to which ‘Kim Il Sung just replaced God’s name with his own,’ she
said.”). Seoul-based NGO Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights reported that official
religious organizations in North Korea mainly exist to secure foreign assistance from religious aid
organizations. Philo Kim, New Religious Policy and the Reality of Religious Freedom in North Korea,
LIFE & HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA, CITIZENS’ ALLIANCE FOR NORTH KOREAN
HUMAN RIGHTS, vol. 31 (2004), http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr.
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7. Learn from the Great Leader Kim Il Sung and master communist dignity, the
methods of revolutionary projects, and the people’s work styles.
8. Preserve dearly the political life the Great Leader Kim Il Sung has bestowed upon
you, and repay loyally for the Great Leader’s boundless political trust and
considerations with high political awareness and skill.
9. Establish a strong organizational discipline so that the entire Party, the entire
people, and the entire military will operate uniformly under the sole leadership of
the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.
10. The great revolutionary accomplishments pioneered by the Great Leader Kim Il
Sung must be succeeded and perfected by hereditary successions until the end.
The tenth principle provides the linkage of absolute authority to Kim Jong Il. According
to KINU, the Ten Great Principles are an expansive norm that controls every expression
of DPRK citizens. Those who disobey are political or ideological criminals. The
Principles’ vagueness allows for arbitrary interpretation that makes them convenient
“legal” tools for punishing people on political grounds. For example, a nine -year-old
child’s family was punished and disappeared on the basis of the Ten Great Principles
because the child had scribbled over the faces of Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung in his
textbook.8
The worship of the Great Leader and Dear Leader is so extreme that people have
died to protect their portraits. Their portraits are ubiquitous; every home has at least one
set. The North Korean Central Broadcast Agency on June 4, 1997, reported that before a
fishing boat went down because of a typhoon, the sailors on board tied their portraits of
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Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il to life-preservers, allowing the portraits to be saved while
the sailors perished. They were posthumously titled heroes of the Republic.9
International media has also reported on this type of behavior. Time magazine reported
that a North Korean caught in a fire is expected to save the portraits before his own
children.10
In addition to this cult-like mentality, a culture of surveillance pervades the
society. The government runs a covert surveillance network. The People’s Security
Agency, State Security Protection Agency, and Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) each plant
informants in all places of work and units of organization. They are recruited locally.
Workers do not know who the informants are. They may number from one out of five to
ten workers, so the workers must assume that everyone is an informant and behave
accordingly.11
The KWP is one of the two main organs for control over the people. The other is
the People’s Army. Kim Jong Il controls both. He is the general-secretary of the Korean
Workers’ Party (KWP), which controls the government and the army, and is chairman of
the People’s Army.12 He inherited his position as KWP general-secretary from his father
Kim Il Sung, as the previous KWP leader. Hereditary succession, as stipulated in the
tenth of the Ten Great Principles, is not embraced by other communist states. The
pervasiveness of Kim Jong Il’s control is manifest in the many positions he holds in the
9
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government organizational structure. He chairs the Politburo, which is the KWP’s
council of policy advisors. In addition, he is the premier for the Cabinet National
Defense Judiciary Commission, which is responsible for oversight of national policy
implementation. The Supreme People’s Assembly merely approves without question
Kim Jong Il’s annual budget. Kim Jong Il is able to keep the elites in his machinery
satisfied with lavish gifts and privileges. At the same time, millions suffer from chronic
food insecurity perpetuated by his government.13
That the DPRK is probably the most controlled, authoritarian regime in the world
works to the advantage of the prosecution of Kim Jong Il, as it lessens the difficulty to
prove that he knowingly committed, ordered, solicited, induced, aided, abetted, assisted,
or contributed to the commission of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes
and therefore would be individually liable for them. As the superior authority over the
DPRK, he would also be individually liable for failing to repress or submit to judicial
authorities the commission of these crimes. Of course, others at the top of his regime14
13
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include the Party Secretaries for Propaganda (Chung Ha Chul), Police (Kae Un Tae), Personnel (Kim Kuk
Tae), Military Industry (Chun Byung Hol), Worker Mobilization (Kim Choong Lin), Economy (Han Sung
Ryong), Science Technology (Cho Tae Bok), Revolution Record (Kim Ki Nam). Other responsible
persons are the principal chiefs of departments or offices: Inspection, Kim Jong Il’s Office Mgmt., Party
Org., Propaganda and Promotion, Int’l Relations, Military, Unification Front-Line, External Relations, 35th
Room Intelligence Collection, War Strategy, Military Industry, Economic Policy Inspection, Light
Industry, Agricultural Inspection, Science and Education, Workers’ Group, Finance, 38th Room Office
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are also criminally culpable and must be included in any UN investigation of the DPRK
situation. But this article focuses on Kim Jong Il as the one most responsible for the
abuses of his regime.
That Kim Jong Il had the requisite knowledge of these crimes is almost without
question because of the very nature of the society that he and his father have constructed
– one based on surveillance and absolute control. Kim Jong Il’s direct involvement in the
prison camp system, where most of these crimes occur, is traceable to 1973, when he
took over the Party’s security apparatus and reorganized it.15 The prison camp system
was under his direct control and the number of inmates grew substantially, including the
addition of four more camps in 1980.16 His direct control has been evident in the years
since. After Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, executions in the camps were suspended for
about a month. But they reconvened when word spread that Kim Jong Il wanted to “hear

Mgmt., 39th Room Office Mgmt., Party History Research Room, Central Attorney General, Central Court,
National Defense Committee (People’s Army General Political Bureau Chief, Vice Chair, and five
Committee Members), Military Supply, Mobilization Bureau, People’s Army Defense Commander, Body
Guards, National Security, and the People’s Security.
Hwang provided the names of persons holding these positions and, as a former member of the
inner circle of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, understands how the D.P.R.K. power structure operates.
Although Hwang defected in 1997, he apparently has sources he believes provide him with current
information on the internal workings of the DPRK regime. He emphasizes that Kim Jong Il is the most
responsible, as the other officials have little choice but to follow his decisions.
15

JASPER BECKER, ROGUE REGIME, KIM JONG IL AND THE LOOMING THREAT OF NORTH

KOREA 86 (Oxford University Press 2005).
16

Id.

9

the sound of gunshots again.”17 Executions became daily in 1995 allegedly pursuant to
Kim’s orders. KINU also reported that in 1998, Kim Jong Il instructed that firing squads
in public executions aim at victims’ heads, as “their brains were bad.”18 Human rights
investigator David Hawk reported that a former body guard of Kim Jong Il believed Kim
Jong Il personally intervened to release him from a political prison camp after nearly four
years of quarrying stones for 14 hours a day.19 Hawk also stated that such camps are
administered by the National Security Agency, which reports directly to Kim Jong Il.20
Kim Jong Il has a strong interest in fully controlling the activities of the National Security
Agency, as it is the key agency for information collection.21 Informants for the agency
include former camp inmates. Kim must know of the activities in the camps.
Indeed, Kim has reportedly closed down camps out of fear that the international
community, particularly Americans, would discover their existence.22 Journalist Jasper
Becker writes that Kim closed five camps, including several near Pyongyang, and moved
the inmates to other camps apparently because he became alarmed that the outside world
might learn about them. Considering Kim’s involvement in the camps’ development and
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his efforts to hide them, Becker concludes Kim Jong Il must “be conscious of how the
camps violate every international norm, but not be concerned enough to change themonly to prevent the outside world from learning about them.”23
In addition, Kim Jong Il controls confinement facilities outside of the prison
camps. For example, pursuant to Kim Jong Il’s instructions in “Regarding Military’s
Self-education for Minor Violators,” forced-labor units are organized and operating in
each city and county.24 Persons held in such facilities also suffer human rights abuses.
The opacity of the DPRK to foreigners is well-known. The secrecy extends to the
inner circles of the Kim regime. Hwang Jang Yop, the highest-ranking defector from the
DPRK and a key architect of the juche ideology, has noted, “Whenever there is a
gathering, Kim Jong-il always emphasizes two things. One is keeping the party’s secrets,
and the other is refraining from pinning one’s hopes on any individual official.”25
Journalist Bradley K. Martin writes that Kim’s secretiveness may have been motivated by
fear of the consequences of having his secrets revealed. Hwang said Kim “has cruelly
killed countless people. His worst fear is having these crimes exposed.” Thus “keeping
secrets is the essence of life in the party.”26
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Kim Jong Il is also likely aware of international criticism of the DPRK’s human
rights abuses. The government-controlled press has responded directly to such criticism.
An example is its response to US President George W. Bush’s meeting with North
Korean defector Kim Chol Hwan, who wrote about his horrendous life in a DPRK prison
camp in The Aquariums of Pyongyang. The state-run Korean Central News Agency
specifically attacked the meeting by dismissing “defectors” as “just a handful of
hooligans and criminals…”27 In addition, the DPRK has participated in UN Commission
on Human Rights sessions in Geneva to deny charges of human rights violations against
it.28 Many reputable organizations, such as KINU, the US State Department, Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the DPRK, produce human rights reports on the DPRK that are easily
accessible, such as on the internet, which Kim Jong Il is said to surf.29 There is no
indication that he is mentally incapacitated or under the control of others who block
information from him. Thus, it is highly improbable that he would be unaware of the

party and in front of the guests he declared her a counterrevolutionary and ordered her execution, which
was voluntarily carried out by her husband. “His intention was to issue a warning to those present that
leaking whatever went on at drinking parties would be punishable by death.”
27
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existence of the abuses. Indeed, it is more probable that he, as the supreme leader,
instigated them.

B. The DPRK has a policy of committing crimes against humanity, genocide, and war
crimes.

The DPRK is permeated with human rights violations in every aspect of its
society. The entire population is divided into three classes based on family background
and loyalty: core, wavering, and hostile.30 Although this practice has been allegedly
abolished by law, it persists, as indicated by defectors.31 Those in the lower classes
particularly face scrutiny and often arbitrary punishment for alleged misbehavior on
political grounds. New York-based Human Rights Watch reported, “those at the bottom
of this class system suffer permanent discrimination and the most intense persecution, a
fate that is passed from generation to generation.”32
Citizens must demonstrate absolute loyalty to Kim Jong Il; otherwise, they may
be forcibly sent to political labor colonies, camps, or prison facilities without adequate
due process. These constitute a distinct system of incarceration in the DPRK, according
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to David Hawk’s The Hidden Gulag, Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps.33 A second
system consists of smaller, shorter-term detention facilities along the DPRK-People’s
Republic of China (PRC or China) border. They are used to punish North Koreans who
flee to China, but are forcibly repatriated to the DPRK by Chinese authorities.34
The facilities of both systems have a high rate of death for reasons such as hard
labor and lack of food. Becker estimates about one million have died.35 Those who have
been repatriated face torture and if pregnant, forced abortion or infanticide motivated by
the nationality (or potentially the ethnicity) of the child. Those who are Christians have
also faced heightened abuse because of their religious faith. Rapes have also been
reported in addition to beatings, torture, testing of chemical and biological weapons36 and
other gross mistreatment. Guilt -by-association is also the norm, with relatives of purged
political prisoners sentenced with them to a lifetime of brutal forced labor without legal
due process.37 Types of labor include mining of gold, coal, iron, and magnesite under
unsafe conditions and production of textile goods, logging, and farming, all under
grueling, slave-like conditions.38 Living conditions are horrifically unsanitary and, with
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starvation-level rations, produce illness and death.39 Crimes by the regime are by no
means limited to these incarceration systems. Other facilities throughout the DPRK also
are sites for abuses.40 But for the purposes of this article, they provide a particularly
strong factual foundation for building a criminal case against Kim Jong Il and his cadres.
Non-DPRK citizens are also victims of crimes. More than 500 Republic of Korea
(ROK) prisoners-of-war, who may suffer abuses, are still reportedly incarcerated in the
DPRK in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and Geneva Conventions.41 In
addition, hundreds of kidnapping victims, who are still alive out of the thousands who
have been kidnapped by the DPRK from the ROK, Japan, other parts of Asia, Europe,
and the Middle East, suffer abuses as well.42
These crimes reflect a culture of criminality that characterizes the Kim Jong Il
regime. In addition to these violations, the government engages in trade of illegal items,
such as drugs, and produces counterfeit money. DPRK embassies and diplomats abroad
are known to channel funds from illegal activities to Kim Jong Il’s personal slush fund.
Kim Jong Il is in reality running a criminal enterprise.43 Indeed, the economic benefits of
the forced labor camps, borne through the criminal loss of many lives, could conceivably
contribute significantly to the DPRK’s gross national product. Forced labor itself may

39
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extend beyond the DPRK’s boundaries with DPRK-government-owned farms and
factories using North Korean workers located in the Czech Republic, Russia, Libya,
Bulgaria, and Saudi Arabia, and Angola.44 Trafficking of women and girls also extends
beyond borders.
In addition, the threat of weapons of mass destruction extends beyond the nuclear
weapons now contemplated by the six-party talks. The DPRK may have the world’s
largest arsenal of chemical weapons.45 It also likely has a biological weapons
capability.46 It is a known proliferator of missiles and the fear is that this could extend to
weapons-of-mass- destruction materials to terrorists.47 While these other matters are
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outside the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction, they further illustrate the impunity of the Kim
Jong Il regime.48

III. UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION FOR ICC JURISDICTION.

The DPRK is not a party to the treaty creating and governing the ICC, known as
the Rome or ICC Statute.49 Nonetheless, the ICC may have jurisdiction over crimes
committed by DPRK citizens if the UN Security Council refers a case to it, acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, pursuant to Article 13(b)50 of the ICC Statute.51 The
48
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jurisdiction would be limited to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
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D.P.R.K. is a state party to two of the four treaties with bodies that may consider individual
communications, the ICCPR and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), but it is not a party to the Optional Protocols required for such communications. (The
D.P.R.K. is also a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.) The D.P.R.K. sought to withdraw from the ICCPR in August 1997
but the Secretary-General was of the opinion that such a withdrawal would not be possible unless all state
parties to the ICCPR agreed to it. The D.P.R.K. also has not declared an acceptance of the competence of
the U.N. Human Rights Committee for hearing complaints from state parties of the ICCPR. Regarding
other inter-state complaints in the treaty body system, the D.P.R.K. has made a reservation specifically
opting out of the CEDAW Article 29 regarding disputes between state parties. The D.P.R.K. also does not
recognize compulsory jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice. The U.N. Commission on Human
Rights has passed resolutions condemning D.P.R.K. human rights violations and has appointed a Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the D.P.R.K. Other relevant Special Rapporteurs include
those on extrajudicial executions, the right to food, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of religion,
and violence against women. Relevant U.N. Working Groups include those on Arbitrary Detention and on
Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances. D.P.R.K. victims and others with direct evidence who have
exhausted domestic remedies or can show that domestic redress would be ineffective may use the 1503
procedure of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. They may also for violations of women’s rights
present a complaint to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women. However, this mechanism and the
1503 procedure are not intended for direct redress of individual injury. Other mechanisms for individual
complaints exist in U.N. organizations, such as the International Labor Organization.
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See ICC Statue, supra note 49, art. 5. Although the crime of aggression is also referenced in Article 5, it

is not an actionable crime under the ICC Statute until the treaty is amended with a definition and elements
for that crime.
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the entry into force of the ICC Statute, which was July 1, 2002, pursuant to Article 11.53
Article 17 also requires that the domestic court system of the state in question must not be
adequately addressing the crimes, as the ICC’s jurisdiction is complementary to national
judicial systems.54 Among the criteria for admissibility, if the state that has jurisdiction
over the case is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution” and the case is of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the ICC, then
the ICC may hear the case.55 Given Kim Jong Il’s control of all government functions,
the DPRK legal system’s failure to provide adequate judicial process generally, and the
severity of the regime’s abuses, these admissibility requirements are most probably met.
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See id. art. 11.
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See id. art. 1 and art. 17. In its Jan. 25, 2005, report, the UN’s International Commission of Inquiry on

Darfur stated that complementary jurisdiction may extend to jurisdiction exercised by states on the basis of
universal jurisdiction. It stated that a general rule of international law exists authorizing States to assert
universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It stated further that
generally principles currently prevailing arguably make the exercise of universal jurisdiction subject to two
major conditions. First, the person suspected or accused of an international crime must be present on the
territory of the prosecuting state. Second, before initiating criminal proceedings, this State should request
the territorial State (where the crime has allegedly been perpetrated) or the State of active nationality (the
State of which the person suspected is a national) whether it is willing to institute proceedings against that
person and hence prepared to request his or her extradition. Only if the State or States in question refuse to
seek the extradition, or are patently unable or unwilling to bring the person to justice, may the State on
whose territory the person is present initiate proceedings against him or her.
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It is difficult to imagine under current circumstances the DPRK judiciary fairly trying the
man who controls it.56
In addition, Section V of this article will demonstrate that the abuses most likely
constitute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The magnitude and
severity of the crimes are of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the ICC. The
DPRK situation is at least of the same order as, if not worse than, the Darfur, Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Northern Uganda situations currently under investigation by the
ICC. At least one million persons are estimated to have died in the DPRK’s prison
camps, assuming that 10 percent of a constant prison population of 200,000 to 300,000
died each year.57 In addition, famine due to government intent or recklessness has killed
one to 2.5 million persons. While many deaths occurred prior to July 1, 2002, they are an
important reminder of the character of the Kim Jong Il regime. Since this date, an
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KINU (2005), supra note 7, at 90-91, states: “Structurally, the North Korean court system is placed

below the Supreme People’s Assembly, the National Defense Commission, and the cabinet. As a result,
there is a strong possibility of human rights violations because the independence of the court system is not
guaranteed and the courts are controlled by the ‘guidance’ of other state organizations. Most importantly,
the independence of the court is difficult to maintain since the judges are politically responsible for the
sentences they impose. “ KINU (2005), supra note 7, at 93, also notes that North Korea has adopted a
people’s jury system. It appears to follow somewhat the jury system of the Anglo-American courts. “But,
in reality, it is a system employed to exercise the Party’s control over the judicial system… In fact, their
primary role is not to provide fair and objective trials but to rubberstamp the conviction of the accused
wrongdoer.” KINU (2005), supra 7, at 119, notes that whether an accused is executed usually depends on
his or her family background.
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estimated 80,000 or more have died.58 This figure is constantly growing. Today’s
victims, many of whom have suffered for decades, would undoubtedly have their
interests served by an ICC investigation and prosecution.
Crimes against humanity and war crimes in the situation of Sudan have been
sufficient to be a threat to peace, pursuant to Chapter VII59 of the UN Charter, thereby
allowing Security Council referral to the ICC on this basis.60 While the DPRK is not
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See infra notes 138 and 139 and accompanying text. It is difficult to determine the number of deaths

caused by crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes in the D.P.K.R. Becker’s estimate of
200,000 to 300,000 persons in the camps is higher than the U.S. State Department’s estimate of 150,000 to
200,000. However, the 10 percent death rate may be too conservative. In addition, it does not include
deaths outside of the camps.
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Article 39 of Chapter VII states that the “Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to

the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security.” Article 41 states “the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures…” Article 42 provides for use of force if the Article 41 measures
are inadequate. Articles 25 and 48 of the U.N. Charter obligate member states to carry out decisions taken
under Chapter VII. The DPRK as a member state would thus be obligated.
In addition, the concept of “the responsibility to protect” has been emerging as required of states
regarding their own citizens and that failure to meet this responsibility allows for the international
community to act to address this breach. S. C. Res. 1674, adopted April 28, 2006, expresses the Security
Council’s support for the protection of civilians and other enforcement of international legal obligations,
although it does not invoke its Chapter VII powers. S. C. Res. 1674, available at http://www.un.org.
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S. C. Res. 1593 took note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations of

international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur, determined that the situation in Sudan
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troubled by fighting between rebel and government forces as is Sudan, its activities in
total pose a threat to international peace and security. The DPRK’s likely production of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, its known proliferation of
missiles and potential WMD transferal to terrorists are threatening to peace. Trade with
terrorists is not difficult to contemplate given that the government engages in trade of
illegal drugs and other illegal items in criminal networks that terrorists may also access.
The oppression of the Kim Jong Il regime and the refusal by China to protect
DPRK refugees prevent the instability that characterizes the Darfur situation. Such
“stability” (which may be ultimately precarious) founded upon crimes against humanity,
genocide, and war crimes, while inadequate food supplies also continue in the DPRK,
should not preclude a Security Council referral to the ICC. Security Council Resolution
1593 used broad language to describe the basis for its Chapter VII action. It stated that
“the situation in Sudan” constituted a threat to international peace and security, not
specifically limiting the threat to violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights law in Darfur. Similarly, the situation in the DPRK constitutes a threat to
international peace and security. A Security Council referral of the DPRK situation, in
which one or more of the crimes under Article 5 appears to have been committed, to the
ICC would thus be possible on that basis. The language of the Security Council
Resolution would necessarily not name particular suspects to avoid any pre-judgment of
guilt.

continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security, acted under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, and decided to refer the situation in Darfur since July 1, 2002, to the Prosecutor of the ICC. The
International Commission of Inquiry found the perpetration of crimes against humanity and war crimes, but
not genocide.
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Security Council action to refer the DPRK situation to the ICC prosecutor would
be difficult to achieve, in some ways for the same reasons economic sanctions would also
be. The PRC, for example, would be highly unlikely to support such an action. The
United States, because of the Bush administration’s opposition to the ICC, may also have
difficulty with this avenue. However, both the PRC and the United States did not veto
such an action in the case of Darfur in the Sudan and so demonstrate an unwillingness to
completely close off such a possibility. The PRC also did not veto Security Council
sanctions against four Sudanese individuals, and the US voted in favor.61 Given its
energy needs and strategic goals in Africa, the PRC has an interest in maintaining good
relations with the Sudan, yet allowed these Security Council sanctions.
Thus various factors could conceivably coalesce to allow all permanent Security
Council members to either abstain or vote positively for a referral of the DPRK situation
to the ICC. Such factors include extreme lack of cooperation by the DPRK in the sixparty talks, highly publicized exposure of DPRK human rights violations that makes a
veto politically difficult, DPRK engagement in terrorism or crime of a magnitude that
makes continued PRC support untenable, any security threat or gain that makes
cooperation with the permanent Security Council members more attractive than
continued support of the DPRK. This type of cooperation was the case during the last
61

S. C. Res. 1593 and 1672 available at http://www.un.org. In subsequent Security Council Resolution

1679, the PRC voted in favor of and even suggested tough language to consider under Chapter VII “strong
and effective measures, such as a travel ban and assets freeze, against any individual or group that violates
or attempts to block the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.” USUN Press Release, Remarks
by Ambassador John R. Bolton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on Iran, Sudan and Other
Matters, at the Security Council Stakeout, May 16, 2006, http://www.state.gov.
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DPRK nuclear crisis in 1994. Before a sanctions resolution against the DPRK was to be
considered by the Security Council, the PRC told the DPRK it may not be able to count
on its veto because of the strength of international opinion against it. The PRC also had
been privately irritated by the DPRK’s actions and concerned that they could lead to
problems at its borders. The DPRK soon after the Chinese pressure engaged in
negotiations to end the crisis. Thus, PRC cooperation is not an impossibility.62
Despite these political difficulties, this article explores the possibility of
prosecution before the ICC because it demonstrates the gravity of the abuses of the
DPRK regime and how legal action would be useful. If the current six-party talks fail to
make concrete progress in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, the prospect of UN
Security Council sanctions is likely. In such a case, Security Council members should
consider an investigation and referral of the DPRK situation to the ICC (or, as Section VI
of this article will discuss, to a special tribunal) as seriously as it considers economic
sanctions. Prosecution targets the persons responsible for DPRK behavior and thus is
more just than the blunt instrument of economic sanctions that harm millions. Of course,
economic sanctions would offer the advantage of being more enforceable at this time
than arrest warrants for Kim Jong Il and his cadres.
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DON OBERDORFER, THE TWO KOREAS 320 (Basic Books 2001). Current informal Chinese

commentary has included disrespect of Kim Jong Il as someone who inherited rather than earned his
position, contrary to Communist doctrine, and as responsible for the D.P.R.K.’s own version of “cultural
revolution,” which is considered by many Chinese to be former Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong’s
great mistake.

24

Still, the political weight of the issuance of an arrest warrant based on the
prosecutor showing “reasonable grounds” to believe that the person has committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC (Article 58), and even more strongly, a
confirmation by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber that the prosecutor has shown “sufficient
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the
crimes charged” (Article 61(7)),63 would bear potentially negative consequences for Kim
Jong Il. The stigma of an objective legal determination by the ICC that it found
reasonable grounds to believe that he was criminally responsible for crimes against
humanity, genocide, and war crimes would carry greater credibility than political
condemnations from self-interested states.
Perhaps even the political situation could change sufficiently to allow an arrest
and prosecution of Kim Jong Il. Such was the situation in the case of then-Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President Slobodan Milosevic, who was indicted four
years after negotiating the Dayton accords and was at trial in The Hague until his death
by natural causes on March 11, 2006. The events leading up to his trial included his loss
of an election, his attempt to rig the results, his loss of office by popular revolution, and
finally his arrest and deportation.64 The political circumstances necessary for an actual
prosecution of Kim Jong Il would also probably require the popular support of the North
Korean people. While difficult to imagine at this time, the removal of Kim Jong Il under
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Marlise Simons, World Briefing/ Europe: The Hague: Inquiry Shows Milosevic Died a Natural Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006. Gary J. Bass, Milosevic in The Hague, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2003.
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these circumstances would mean a “regime change” founded on far sounder ground than
any that could result from the use of military force.65
In addition, just as the Milosevic indictment advanced the development of
international law, the instigation of a prosecution against Kim Jong Il would pose a
significant addition to the growing international legal regime against impunity. A charge
for the crime against humanity of extermination, for example, for the DPRK policies that

65

The United States used military force to invade Panama in December 1989 and gained custody of

General Manuel Noriega, who was tried in Florida on drug trafficking charges. A U.S. invasion of the
D.P.R.K. to arrest Kim Jong Il would not be a recommended course, however, as the risk of excessive
casualties would be high. MICHAEL O’HANLON & MIKE MOCHIZUKI, CRISIS ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA, HOW TO DEAL WITH A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA 60-62 (McGraw-Hill 2003)
(“even though U.S.-ROK forces enjoy superiority and could increase their superiority quickly through a
U.S. military buildup, they could not be confident of winning an offensive war against the DPRK with low
casualties to themselves and surrounding civilian populations…North Korea would likely be much harder
to defeat than Iraq.”). A peaceful, popularly supported, more democratic removal of Kim Jong Il would
also be more likely to produce an acceptable replacement for him.
The question of D.P.R.K. governance can be linked to the larger question of resolving the Korean
War. The problems on the Korean peninsula may be framed as unfinished business of the UN (and its key
member states) in ending Japanese colonialism and in ending the Korean conflict. See Grace M. Kang, The
Three Freedoms of the United Nations in Northeast Asia, KOREA OBSERVER, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2005).
The UN Security Council acted under Chapter VII to create a US-led multilateral force to repel northern
forces from the south in 1950. The UN Command continues today. A possible outcome could be the
creation of a UN peacekeeping mission to monitor a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War and the
unification of north and south. Democratic elections would be a key component of peacebuilding efforts.
A rotating or joint presidency could accommodate both northern and southern constituencies. This is one
type of context that could allow for the enforcement of arrest warrants against Kim Jong Il and his cadres.
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have led to mass starvation, would mark new ground for a crime that has occurred
repeatedly in states and will undoubtedly appear again.66 A growing caseload against
“atrocity crimes” – a term for the complex categories of crimes that are under the
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals and established by “atrocity law”67 reinforces their illegality, promoting deterrence and universal intolerance of their
commission.

IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR A CASE AGAINST KIM JONG IL FOR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, GENOCIDE, AND WAR CRIMES.

The applicable law for cases before the ICC is stated in Article 21 of the ICC
Statute. It states that the ICC shall apply first, the ICC Statute, Elements of Crimes and
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; second, where appropriate, applicable treaties and
the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the
international law of armed conflict; and failing that, general principles of law derived by
the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world.68 Thus, let us turn to the key
articles of the ICC Statute to begin our analysis of a legal case against Kim Jong Il for
crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.
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Establishing individual criminal liability linking crimes to Kim Jong Il is of
course critical for any prosecution against him. ICC Statute Article 25 Individual
criminal responsibility states:
…a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally
responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact
occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including
providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of
furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to
commit genocide; …69

69

See id. art. 25.
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In addition, the ICC Statute provides for individual criminal liability by attaching
it to superior authority. This enhances a case against Kim Jong Il as he enjoys apparently
absolute superior authority. The ICC Statute also specifically states that official capacity
as a Head of State or Government does not exempt criminal responsibility, thus allowing
the possible prosecution of Kim Jong Il, irrespective of his position.70 This codifies the
precedent set by the indictment of then-FRY President Slobodan Milosevic in 1999.71
Article 28 Responsibility of commanders and other superiors makes the link
between those who actually carried out the crimes and those who are their superiors when
the superiors failed to prevent or repress the crimes. It states:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall
be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective
authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to
exercise control properly over such forces, where: (i) That military commander
or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have
known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and (ii)
That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
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ICC would allow for prosecution of the head of a state that is not a party to the ICC Treaty.
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(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph
(a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and
control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
subordinates, where: (i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes; (ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within
the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and (iii) The superior
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.72
While the above includes mental elements for criminal responsibility, the ICC Statute
also sets forth the requirements for the mental aspect of crimes generally in Article 30
Mental Element. This article requires:
a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment …only if the
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge… [A] person has
intent where: (a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the
conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events…
“[K]nowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will
occur in the ordinary course of events.73
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The Elements of Crimes, named as a source of law in Article 21, provide further
instruction on the mental element, as they shall assist the Court in the interpretation and
application of [A]rticle 6 Genocide, Article 7 Crimes against humanity, and Article 8
War Crimes, according to Article 9.74 The general introduction to the Elements of
Crimes states that “Existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts
and circumstances.”75 Thus the requirements of Article 30 Mental Element to the crimes
addressed by Articles 6, 7, and 8 can be met by inference.
Articles 6, 7, and 8 provide the additional legal requirements for establishing
Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes. The Elements of Crimes breaks
each crime down into component parts (elements) that must be proved for a conviction.
The elements generally list conduct first and then consequences and circumstances
associated with each crime. The Prosecutor must prove the elements of each crime,
including mental intent, beyond a reasonable doubt, as the accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty, pursuant to Article 66.76 In addition, Article 22(2) Nullum crimen
sine lege states that a definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be
extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. This codifies existing customary
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law.77 Section V of this article provides the additional specific legal requirements for
each type of crime.
Thus, the above is the basic legal framework for forming a case against Kim Jong
Il. Section V analyzes facts using this framework to determine whether Kim Jong Il is
liable for specific crimes. It aims to determine if published facts from credible sources
form “a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has
been or is being committed” pursuant to Article 53 Initiation of an investigation.78 After
the initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor, the factual standard for an issuance of
an arrest warrant by the Pre- Trial Chamber is “reasonable grounds to believe that the
person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court,” pursuant to Article 58
Issuance by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear.79 After
the accused’s appearance before the Court, the factual standard for a confirmation of the
charges by the Pre-Trial Chamber is “sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds
to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged,” pursuant to Article 61
Confirmation of the charges before trial.80 Of course, these are lower standards than the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for a conviction.81
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V. ANALYZING THE LAW AND FACTS FOR SPECIFIC CRIMES.

The following discussion systematically applies the law to facts to determine if
Kim Jong Il and his cadres are criminally liable for genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. It sets forth the legal requirements for particular crimes and applies
them, with the legal requirements for individual responsibility and mental intent stated in
Section IV, to credible facts in the public domain. While many recent reports rely on
testimonies of crimes prior to July 1, 2002, they indicate the likelihood of such crimes
taking place within the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC. There is no indication of a
substantial reduction of these crimes.82

A. Genocide.

Article 6 Genocide states “genocide” means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.83
In addition to the forms of individual criminal responsibility described above, Article 25
Individual criminal responsibility also states that a person shall be criminally responsible
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person
“(e) In respect of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.”84
Genocide is one of the most serious international criminal law violations and
therefore is strictly construed, reinforcing the strict construction requirement of Article 22
Nullum crimen sine lege.85 The Statute and the Elements of Crimes do not define
“national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Other tribunal rulings and authorities on
international law are instructive as to their meaning. The International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial Chamber in Blagojevic & Jokic stated that a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group is identified “by using as a criterion the
stigmatization of the group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its
perceived national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.”86 The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Trial Chamber in Akayesu stated that a national
group is a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common
citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties; an ethnic group is generally
83
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defined as a group whose members share a common language or culture; the
conventional definition of racial group is based on the hereditary physical traits often
identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or
religious factors; the religious group is one whose members share the same religion,
denomination or mode of worship.87
While many prisoners probably do not constitute a “national, ethnical, racial or
religious group” as such, that is distinguishable on those grounds from the DPRK
officials who inflict harm on them, there is still substantial testimony of actions against
persons based on national and religious grounds. In addition, Akayesu indicates that it is
not impossible to punish under the Genocide Convention the physical destruction of a
group that is stable and membership is by birth but nonetheless is not a national, racial,
ethnical, or religious group.88 This would arguably support a finding of genocide for
those North Koreans who suffer physical destruction because they are the relatives of
political prisoners or politically suspect persons - a group determined by birth. Given the
persistent division of the population into core, wavering, and hostile categories based
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primarily on the actions of previous generations and the punishment of relatives of
alleged “criminals” in addition to the “criminals” themselves, certainly an argument can
be made that a relatively stable and permanent group is targeted whose membership is
determined largely by birth.
However, the UN’s International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Darfur
Commission) still relied on the four groups, not the more open-ended “stable and
permanent” characterization, as affording protection from genocide. It allowed for an
expansive definition of membership by emphasizing a subjective standard: whether the
victim perceived and was perceived to be a member of one of the four groups. It stated
that this expansive determination based on subjective perceptions of members of groups
is part of international customary law.89 The Commission noted in the case of the
Rwandan genocide:
the Tutsi and the Hutu do not constitute at first glance distinct ethnic, racial,
religious or national groups. They have the same language, culture and religion,
as well as basically the same physical traits. In Akayesu the ICTR Trial Chamber
emphasized that the two groups were nevertheless distinct because (i) they had
been made distinct by the Belgian colonizers when they established a system of
identity cards differentiating between the two groups …and (ii) the distinction
was confirmed by the self-perception of the members of each group.90
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Cases subsequent to Akayesu also ground genocide to the four groups. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza & Ngeze, for example, called the Tutsis an ethnic group.91 That the Tutsis
were associated with a political agenda, “effectively merging ethnic and political
identity” did not erode the protection due them nor, apparently, the characterization of
their group as ethnic. This would help support a case of genocide for North Koreans born
into a targeted political class.92 Whether the ICC would rule in favor of an expansive
reading of protected groups, i.e. any group that was stable and permanent, as mentioned
by Akayesu is unknown. Article 22’s strict construction requirement indicates it would
not.93 Thus whether North Koreans who suffer physical destruction perceive themselves
and are perceived to be targeted on national, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds, and
other requirements of genocide (e.g. special intent, as discussed below), would have to be
determined.
Perhaps the court could seize upon an expansive reading of culture as a way to
distinguish on ethnical grounds persons who suffer physical destruction because they are
relatives of political prisoners or are born into a persecuted class. The physical
destruction, in part, of such a group would include killing and causing serious bodily or
mental harm (well-documented in the prison camps), deliberately inflicting conditions of
life calculated to bring about physical destruction (particularly in the prison camps, but
also through inadequate food distribution outside of the camps), imposing measures
intended to prevent births (due to the prohibition of sex and forced abortions in the prison
91
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camps), and forcibly transferring children (to the prison camps). However, strict
construction as required by Article 22 makes such a reading unlikely.94
While a case for genocide on these grounds may thus be a legal stretch, the
targeting of North Koreans on national and religious grounds appears to be well within
the definition of genocide. The national (and potentially ethnical) cases are the forced
abortions and killing of babies who were fathered by Chinese or other non-Koreans.
Perpetrators have explicitly stated that they were performing these acts because the fetus
or baby was “half-Han Chinese.”95 The mother was typically a North Korean who had
fled to China, become pregnant there and was forcibly repatriated to the DPRK.
In addition, there have been numerous accounts of persons who were targeted
with greater levels of torture and killing because of their religion, e.g. Christianity.96
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Victims of execution include members of underground Christian churches.97 Persons
engaging in religious proselytizing may be arrested and subjected to harsh punishment,
including imprisonment, prolonged detention without charge, torture, or execution.
While the number of religious detainees or prisoners is undetermined, many people are
reportedly detained for their religious beliefs and activities. Starvation and forced labor
are common in incarceration.
In 2002, witnesses testified before the US Congress on the treatment of persons
held in prison camps through the early 1990s.98 The witnesses stated that prisoners held
on the basis of their religious beliefs generally were treated worse than other inmates.
One person testified that in 1990, while serving a sentence in a prison that had a cast-iron
factory, she witnessed the killing of several elderly Christians by security officers who
poured molten iron on them after they refused to renounce their religion and accept the
state ideology of juche. KINU reported that a defector testified that five persons who
were caught trying to propagate religion in 2001 were executed by firing squad. While
these crimes took place before 2002, they indicate the likelihood of similar crimes taking
place within the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC. This is particularly likely given that the
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regime has increased repression of unauthorized religious groups in recent years.99 The
US State Department reported that persons who proselytize or were repatriated and found
to have contacted Christian missionaries outside the country were reportedly punished
severely, tortured, or executed. News reports indicated that the DPRK government had
taken steps to tighten control and increase punishments at the Chinese border, and had
also increased the award for information on any person doing missionary work.100
KINU’s reporting is consistent with this scenario. It noted that the DPRK
imposes heavier punishment on those who make contact with ROK practitioners of
religion, believing that it would lead to foreign encroachment and hamper discipline.
One person who contacted Christians in the PRC was sentenced to three years of work
“rehabilitation.” Another defector reported that he was arrested twice because someone
informed the authorities that he had contacted a missionary. He was released after he
testified that he was not a Christian. Some 60 persons reportedly received 15-year prison
terms for visiting a church upon unconfirmed news that they would be given 15
kilograms of corn if they became Christians.101 A Seoul-based NGO reported that a
family of four refugees, who converted to Christianity in the PRC, was forcibly
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repatriated to the DPRK in 2002 and summarily executed because they refused to deny
their Christian faith.102
While both the half-Chinese babies and the Christians may be numerically small
in comparison to the overall population of abuse victims, they nonetheless meet the legal
requirements to constitute genocide. A large number of victims is not necessarily
required for a genocide conviction. Article 6, which codifies the customary international
rule, does not seem to require that the victims of genocide be numerous. …as long as the
other requisite elements are present, the killing or commission of the other enumerated
offences against more than one person may amount to genocide.103 In Krstic, the Trial
Chamber held that “an intent to destroy only part of the group must nevertheless concern
a substantial part thereof, either numerically or qualitatively.”104
With respect to the half-Chinese babies, it appears that all of that group who were
born to detainees have been targeted. While facts need to be further investigated, they
constitute at least qualitatively a substantial part of a group defined by its national
character. Reports on this targeting make no mention of some half-Chinese babies being
spared; all were seemingly killed in detention.105 KINU reported “All North Korean
defectors testify that they have never seen any female inmate being released from
detention centers accompanied by their children. This fact supports the fact that murders
102
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of newborn babies are routinely carried out at detention facilities.”106 Christians also
appear to be significantly targeted.107 For example, all who have been in contact with
Christians while abroad are sought out by DPRK officials when they are repatriated and
suffer heightened punishment for their Christian association.
Regarding the mens rea (mental intent) requirements for genocide, they include
special intent by the perpetrator to target the victim not on account of his or her
individual qualities or characteristics, but rather only because he or she is a member of a
particular group. This special intent is an aggravated criminal intention in addition to the
criminal intent (intent and knowledge) accompanying the underlying offence (e.g.
killing). In Akayesu, an ICTR Trial Chamber held that special intent is the specific
intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the
perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged. This intent is a mental factor which
is “difficult, even impossible to determine.”108 Given this difficulty, in the absence of a
confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number of
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presumptions of fact. As noted above, the Elements of Crimes also allows for intent to be
inferred from actions.109
Attaching individual criminal responsibility to Kim Jong Il thus is a high
standard. It requires proof that the persons who committed the genocide did it with intent
and knowledge, as defined above, to commit the underlying offence plus the special
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group. To attach liability to Kim Jong
Il, the prosecution must prove that he was a co-perpetrator; an aider and abettor; an
inciter, pursuant to the Article 25 (e) (directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide);110 or other form of participant – (all with special intent); or a superior
responsible for the actions of those who committed genocide.
Given the well-known absolute control of the Kim Jong Il regime, one could
argue that the very fact that the genocide occurred may allow for an inference that he
specifically intended it. This may be true particularly in the case of the Christians, as
Christianity is fundamentally at odds with Kim Jong Il’s juche ideology.111 Such an
109
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inference of special intent may be reasonable, although meeting the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard for a conviction112 may be difficult. But given the extraordinary control
of the Kim Jong Il regime, it may be reasonable to believe that he (with the requisite
special intent) committed the genocide through others; ordered, solicited or induced the
genocide; aided, abetted, or otherwise assisted with the genocide; or intentionally
contributed to the genocide. He would thus be a co-perpetrator, aider and abettor, or
other form of participant. Regarding attaching liability to Kim Jong Il as an inciter, this
author is not aware of any direct and public statements by Kim Jong Il to incite others to
commit genocide.
Attaching liability to Kim Jong Il for a failure to act would be the easiest standard,
as he would not be required to have the specific intent of committing genocide, only his
subordinates would be. A superior official may be held responsible for genocide if it is
proved that he knew that crimes were about to be, or were being, perpetrated, and
deliberately failed to thwart their commission. In Blagojevic & Jokic113 the ICTY Trial
Chamber stated that the mens rea required for superiors is that the superiors knew or had
reason to know that their subordinates (1) were about to commit or had committed
genocide and (2) that the subordinates possessed the requisite specific intent. As
discussed above, Kim Jong Il’s control and surveillance, statements of state-controlled
media, and the ease of access to human rights reports condemning the DPRK for killing
and other abuses against half-Chinese babies and Christians all indicate that Kim Jong Il
knew of these crimes. It is reasonable to believe that he knows of these crimes and has
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failed to stop their commission or submit the matter to competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution. He would therefore be liable as a superior.
The Elements of Crimes elaborates on each type of genocide by breaking each
one down into elements that must be proved for a conviction. Turning to a specific type
of genocide then, the Elements for Article 6(a) Genocide by killing are:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or
religious group.
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
4. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect
such destruction.114
The first three elements are met in the case of killing newborn half-Chinese babies,
because they are half-Chinese. DPRK officials have intentionally killed numerous
newborn babies because they were half-Chinese, thereby destroying in part a national
group of half-Chinese persons.115 The first three requirements are also met in the case of
DPRK officials intentionally killing Christians because they are Christians, thereby
destroying in part a religious group of Christians.
The fourth element is one that is required of all the genocide crimes. The
Introduction to Genocide in the Elements of Crimes elaborates on its meaning. It states:
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With respect to the last element listed for each crime:
-The term “in the context of” would include the initial acts in an emerging pattern;
-The term “manifest” is an objective qualification;
- Notwithstanding the normal requirement for a mental element provided for in
[A]rticle 30, and recognizing that knowledge of the circumstances will usually be
addressed in proving genocidal intent, the appropriate requirement, if any, for a
mental element regarding this circumstance will need to be decided by the Court
on a case-by- case basis.116
Given that the killing of babies and forced abortions occurred regularly and was conduct
that could itself effect destruction of the protected group, it appears this requirement is
met. The same may be concluded for the killing of Christians. Thus all four elements are
met to support a case of genocide by killing. Again, given Kim Jong Il’s absolute
authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he and his cadres are individually liable,
as discussed previously.
The elements for Article 6(d) Genocide by imposing measures intended to prevent
births are:
1. The perpetrator imposed certain measures upon one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or
religious group.
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
4. The measures imposed were intended to prevent births within that group.
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5. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect
such destruction.117
Repeated forced abortions of half-Chinese fetuses because they are half-Chinese meets
these requirements. DPRK officials imposed abortions on North Korean women who
were impregnated by Chinese men with the intent to destroy in part that national group
by preventing births within that group.118 The conduct took place in the context of a
manifest pattern of similar conduct (e.g. infanticide) directed against that group and was
conduct that could itself effect such destruction.
Regarding the targeting of Christians, in the same state-run prison camps and
detention facilities or outside of them, an additional applicable article is Article 6(b)
Genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm. The Elements for this crime are
identical to that for Genocide by killing, except that the first element is:
1. The perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm to one or more
persons.119
Again, regular targeting of Christians because they are Christians to serious bodily or
mental harm, in addition to the other required elements, supports a case for genocide by
this means.
In addition, Article 6(c) Genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about physical destruction may also be applicable. The Elements for
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this crime are identical to that for genocide by killing, except that the first element is
changed and an additional element is added:
1. The perpetrator inflicted certain conditions of life upon one or more
persons.
5. The conditions of life were calculated to bring about the physical
destruction of that group, in whole or in part.120
Given the horrific conditions of the prison camps and the obviously high mortality rate,
the perpetrator inflicted certain conditions of life that were likely calculated to bring
about physical destruction of persons – but whether they were directed particularly at the
Christian detainees, perhaps by a showing of heightened adverse conditions for them
because they are Christians, would have to be proved. In any case, facts indicate a
reasonable basis to believe that Kim Jong Il is liable for genocide against Christians
pursuant to Article 6(a) and (b), in addition to possible liability under (c).

B. Crimes against humanity.

Article 7(1) Crimes against humanity states:
“[C]rimes against humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
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(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph
3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical.121
Article 7(2) states:
(a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit
such attack…122
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The great majority of DPRK human rights abuses likely falls within the category
of crimes against humanity. The vast prison camp system holding 200,000 persons123 is
rife with crimes listed in Article 7(1). They include murder and extermination, in that
large numbers have been killed and conditions such as food deprivation have been
allowed; enslavement, such as the forced labor in the camps; forcible transfer of the
population to these camps; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty
in violation of fundamental rules of international law, again in the arbitrary detention of
persons in these camps; torture; rape or any other form of sexual violence; persecution
against any group on political, national, or religious grounds in connection with crimes
under ICC jurisdiction; enforced disappearance of persons, such as the kidnappings of
ROK and Japanese citizens; other inhumane acts, such as medical experiments using
weapons of mass destruction.
Thus the category of crimes against humanity offers greater scope of actionable
offenses against Kim Jong Il than genocide. For example, it goes beyond the “national,
ethnical, racial, religious group” requirement by including in Article 7(1)(h) groups
identifiable on political, cultural, and gender grounds, in addition to racial, national,
ethnic, and religious grounds.124 With the exception of Article 7(1)(h), crimes against
humanity also do not have a special intent requirement, as genocide does. While there
123
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may be overlap in the objective elements (actus reus) of genocide and crimes against
humanity, there is none with respect to the subjective or mental element (mens rea).125
Crimes against humanity requires the intent to commit the underlying offence plus
knowledge of the widespread or systematic practice constituting the general context of
the offence. In contrast, genocide requires the intent to commit the underlying offence
plus the special intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group. Thus attaching
liability to Kim Jong Il for crimes against humanity may be easier than for genocide.
Given the absolute control over the DPRK that he enjoys, it would be reasonable to argue
that he intentionally committed such crimes (the underlying offense) through other
persons; ordered, solicited or induced the crime; aided, abetted, or otherwise assisted with
the crime; or in any way intentionally contributed to the crime, to paraphrase Article
25.126
Regarding the second mens rea requirement, knowledge of the widespread or
systematic practice, it is listed as one of the context requirements in the Elements of
Crimes for each crime against humanity. The context requirements are the last two
elements for each crime against humanity:
-The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population.
-The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be
part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.127
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“Widespread” refers to the number of victims. In J. Kajelijeli, the ICTR Trial Chamber
adopted the test of “large scale, involving many victims” to define “widespread.”128 The
Chamber found that “systematic” describes the organized nature of the attack. A pattern
of conduct carries evidential value of such an attack. The existence of a policy or plan
also has such evidential value. Clearly the organized systems of prison camps and
detention facilities in the DPRK indicate a policy or plan. (This also demonstrates that
the attack involved multiple commissions of acts referred to in Article 7(1) against a
civilian population “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack” as required by Article 7(2)(a).)129 The attack also need be only
“widespread” or “systematic.” In the situation of the DPRK, it appears both terms are
applicable.
Given Kim Jong Il’s absolute control over the DPRK, it is also likely that he had
knowledge of the conduct in whatever form it may have taken place (murder,
extermination, enslavement, forcible transfer, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, rape,
persecution, abductions) as part of the widespread or systematic attack. This element
does not require proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the
attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization.130 As
discussed above, reports on DPRK human rights abuses that describe this conduct are
widely published and easily accessible. It seems improbable that Kim Jong Il would be
unaware of the existence of these crimes, especially as master of a culture of surveillance.
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Indeed, given his authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he instigated them, as
discussed above. Thus the context requirements of the Elements of Crimes are met.
Even if the ICC found that Kim Jong Il did not perpetrate the underlying offense,
he would be likely liable under Article 28(b) Responsibility of commanders and other
superiors for crimes committed by a subordinate under his effective authority and control,
as a result of his failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where he
either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing such crimes, which concerned activities within his
effective responsibility and control; and he failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures to repress their commission or submit the matter to competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.131 Once again, given Kim Jong Il’s control, surveillance,
and widely available reports, it is improbable that he would not know that his
subordinates were committing crimes against humanity and therefore would be liable as a
superior.
In addition to the intent (mens rea) requirements, each crime against humanity has
two conduct (actus reus) requirements. First, the accused (or a subordinate under the
control of the accused) must have perpetrated the act necessary to accomplish the specific
offense (eg murder). Second, the act must be committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population (a context requirement as
discussed above).
MURDER: Turning then to a specific type of crime against humanity, the
Elements for Article 7(1)(a) Crime against humanity of murder are:
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1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be
part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.132
It is well known that killing has taken place in the prison camps and detention facilities.
The existence of these prisons, Kim Jong Il’s control and implicit approval of them, and
his absolute control over the DPRK provide a reasonable basis to believe that he bears
individual criminal responsibility for the killing. It is reasonable to believe he
intentionally committed the killing through others; ordered, solicited or induced the
killing; aided, abetted, or otherwise assisted with the killing; or intentionally contributed
to the killing. Thus the first element is met. In addition, this conduct constitutes part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population of which Kim Jong Il or
subordinates likely had knowledge, as discussed previously. Thus the context elements
are met, fulfilling the three elements for the crime against humanity of murder. Given the
absolute control Kim Jong Il possesses, it is reasonable to believe he at a minimum bears
individual responsibility as a superior who failed to repress or submit to judicial
authorities this crime against humanity of murder by subordinates under his authority.
To avoid repetition, we will not list the last two (context) elements for each of the
following crimes against humanity, given that they are identical. We will list only the
specific offense and non-context elements of each.
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EXTERMINATION: Thus for the crime against humanity of extermination
(Elements for Article 7(1)(b)), the prosecutor must prove in addition to the context of
intended or known widespread or systematic attack:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons, including by inflicting
conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population.
2. The conduct constituted, or took place as part of, a mass killing of
members of a civilian population. 133
Article 7(2)(b) states “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of
life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about
the destruction of part of a population.134
Conditions within the prison systems include deprivation of food and medicine
that results in frequent death.135 Given that these conditions obviously produce fatal
consequences, their continued existence arguably indicates some calculation to produce
death. Some reports indicate efforts to reduce the number of deaths in the prison camps
by allowing some sick prisoners to go home to recover,136 but this supports an inference
of calculation in that the authorities apparently find a certain level of death acceptable;
their release of some prisoners when sick shows conscious regulation and management of
the quantity of death to be allowed in the camp.
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While a precise figure is not known, surely the number of persons who have died
in the prison camps is high enough to constitute “mass killing.” An ICTR trial chamber
found Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty of extermination for the murder of 16 people, a quantity
apparently sufficient for a finding of extermination.137 Jasper Becker estimates perhaps
“at least a million” have died in the camps, “assuming that 10 percent of a constant prison
population of 200,000 to 300,000 perished each year.”138 This means about 80,000 to
120,000 deaths since July 1, 2002. The U.S. State Department estimates 150,000 to
200,000 persons in the camps. While it did not provide a figure on the number of deaths,
it reported that conditions were “extremely harsh and many prisoners were not expected
to survive. In the camps, prisoners received little food and no medical care.”139 Thus
DPRK authorities have killed persons in numbers that are high enough to constitute mass
killing.
The existence of the prison camps, Kim Jong Il’s implicit approval of them, and
his absolute control over the DPRK provide a reasonable basis to believe that he bears
individual criminal responsibility for the extermination. In addition, this conduct
constitutes part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population of
which Kim Jong Il or subordinates likely had knowledge. Thus the elements for the
crime against humanity of extermination are met. Given the absolute control Kim Jong
Il possesses, it is reasonable to believe he at a minimum bears individual responsibility as
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a superior who failed to repress or submit to judicial authorities the commission of crimes
committed by subordinates under his authority.
In addition to the death-producing conditions of the prison systems, the DPRK
government has created conditions outside of the prisons that also could constitute the
crime against humanity of extermination (and murder). Famine due to government intent
or recklessness would fall under this category.140 An estimated one to 2.5 million persons
have died due to such famine, which began in the 1990s.141 While the most extreme
years of famine in the DPRK took place before the ICC Statute came into force,
conditions for the lower classes of North Korean society since this date may be poor
enough to meet the requirements for the crime against humanity of extermination. Again,
given Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he and his
cadres are individually liable.
ENSLAVEMENT: Article 7(2)(c) states: “‘Enslavement’ means the exercise of
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children.”142 The non-context element for Article 7(1)(c) Crime against humanity of
enslavement is:
1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or
140
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bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation
of liberty.143
The ICTY Trial Chamber in Kunarac and others144 discussed factors to further clarify the
meaning of this crime:145
Under this definition, indications of enslavement include elements of control and
ownership; the restriction or control of an individual’s autonomy, freedom of
choice or freedom of movement; and, often, the accruing of some gain to the
perpetrator. The consent or free will of the victim is absent…. Further indications
of enslavement include exploitation; the exaction of forced or compulsory
labour or service, often without remuneration and often, though not necessarily,
involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and human trafficking. With
respect to forced or compulsory labour or service, international law, including
some of the provisions of Geneva Convention IV and the Additional Protocols,
make clear that not all labour or service by protected persons, including civilians,
in armed conflicts, is prohibited – strict conditions are, however, set for such
labour or service. The ‘acquisition’ or ‘disposal’ of someone for monetary or
other compensation, is not a requirement for enslavement. Doing so, however, is
a prime example of the exercise of the right of ownership over someone. … The
Trial Chamber is therefore in general agreement with the factors put forward by
the Prosecutor, to be taken into consideration in determining whether enslavement
143
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was committed. These are the control of someone’s movement, control of
physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter
escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity,
subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.
…(emphasis added.)
The forced labor in the prison camps thus constitutes enslavement, as defined
above. Prisoners are restricted in their freedom of movement. They are subject to forced
labor to the gain of the DPRK authorities. For example, they mine gold, coal, iron, and
magnesite. They also log, farm, and produce textile goods under the harshest
conditions.146 Their movements, physical environment, psychology, and sexuality, are
subject to the control of DPRK authorities, who prevent their escape and subject them to
cruel treatment and abuse for unlimited duration. This conduct in the prison camps
constitutes part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population of
which Kim Jong Il or subordinates likely had knowledge. Again, given Kim Jong Il’s
absolute authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he and his cadres are
individually liable.
The crime against humanity of enslavement may even extend beyond the DPRK’s
boundaries with DPRK-government-owned farms and factories using North Korean
workers located in the Czech Republic, Russia, Libya, Bulgaria, and Saudi Arabia, and
Angola. While the workers are paid a nominal fee, they live under strict surveillance and
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grim conditions. Experts estimate about 10,000 to 15,000 North Koreans work abroad
for the DPRK government.147
In addition, North Korean women are widely reported to be trafficked in the PRC.
They may also be trafficked to other states. DPRK residents have made arrangements
with customers in the PRC to purchase North Korean women.148 Trafficking has also
extended to underage girls, many of whom are involved in the sex business.149 Clearly,
this type of activity falls within the meaning of “enslavement,” as defined by Article
7(2)(c). Given that trafficking is usually intertwined with sexual assault, the crimes
against humanity of rape and sexual violence may also apply.150 Whether the criminal
linkages between persons in the PRC and elsewhere and the DPRK in furtherance of the
trafficking, rape, and sexual violence extend to the Kim Jong Il regime (and are part of an
intended or known widespread or systematic attack) should be investigated to determine
if individual criminal liability may be imputed to Kim Jong Il and his cadres.
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FORCIBLE TRANSFER OF POPULATION: Article 7(2)(d) states:
“‘Deportation or forcible transfer of population’ means forced displacement of the
persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are
lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.”151 The non-context
elements for Article 7(1)(d) Crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer of
population are:
1. The perpetrator deported or forcibly transferred, without grounds permitted under
international law, one or more persons to another State or location, by expulsion
or other coercive acts.
2. Such persons or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were
so deported or transferred.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the
lawfulness of such presence. 152
A Trial Chamber of ICTY in Krstic153 distinguished deportation from forcible transfer. It
stated “Deportation presumes transfer beyond State borders, whereas forcible transfer
relates to displacement within a State.” Thus the prisoners who were sent to DPRK
prison camps without genuine due process fall within the definition of forcible transfer,
as they remained inside the DPRK. The lack of adequate judicial process in forcing
people to leave their homes, where they lawfully resided, to move to prison camps, and
that the perpetrators likely recognized the lawfulness of these people’s presence in their
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homes, creates a reasonable basis for the crime against humanity of forcible transfer of
population. This conduct constitutes part of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population of which Kim Jong Il or subordinates likely had knowledge. Again,
given Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he and his
cadres are individually liable.
IMPRISONMENT: The non-context elements for Article 7(1)(e) Crime against
humanity of imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty are:
1. The perpetrator imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise severely deprived
one or more persons of physical liberty.
2. The gravity of the conduct was such that it was in violation of fundamental rules
of international law.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the
gravity of the conduct.154
An ICTY Trial Chamber, in Kordic & Cerkez,155 held that imprisonment meant “arbitrary
imprisonment, that is to say, the deprivation of liberty of the individual without due
process of law, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population.” Obviously, the facts in the DPRK meet these requirements. DPRK
officials imprisoned persons in prison camps and detention facilities, under deplorable
conditions, violating several fundamental rules of international law, including bona fide
due process, and these officials were likely aware of these circumstances that established
the gravity of the conduct. This conduct leading to imprisonment constitutes part of a
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widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population of which Kim Jong Il or
subordinates likely had knowledge. Again, given Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority and
control, it is reasonable to believe he and his cadres are individually liable.
TORTURE: Article 7(2)(e) states: “‘Torture’ means the intentional infliction of
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or
under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.”156 The non-context
elements for Article 7(1)(f) Crime against humanity of torture are:
1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or
more persons.
2. Such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator.
3. Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or
incidental to, lawful sanctions.157
It is widely reported that torture is perpetrated in the prison camps and detention
facilities.158 Perpetrators have inflicted severe physical and mental pain upon prisoners in
their custody for reasons that are not lawful. Methods of torture, sometimes fatal, include
severe beatings, electric shock, prolonged periods of exposure, and confinement to small
“sweatboxes” in which prisoners were unable to stand upright or lie down for weeks.159
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This conduct constitutes part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population of which Kim Jong Il or subordinates likely had knowledge. Again, given
Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he and his cadres
are individually liable.
RAPE: The non-context elements for Article 7(1)(g)-1 Crime against humanity
of rape are:
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration,
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a
sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any
other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of
a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable
of giving genuine consent.160
Victims and witnesses have stated that prison officials have raped women under their
custody in the prison camps and detention facilities.161 While the rapes themselves may
not result from a policy, this conduct constitutes part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population of which Kim Jong Il or subordinates likely had knowledge.
Given Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he and his
cadres are individually liable, as discussed previously.
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SEXUAL VIOLENCE: The non-context elements for Article 7(1)(g)-6 Crime
against humanity of sexual violence are:
1. The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons
or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force,
or by threat of force or coercion, such as that cause by fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or
such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.
2. Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences in article 7,
paragraph 1(g), of the Statute.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the
gravity of the conduct.162
Again, victims and witnesses have stated that prison officials have committed sexual acts
against prisoners in detention under their custody in prison camps and detention
facilities.163 While the sexual acts themselves may not result from a policy, this conduct
constitutes part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population of
which Kim Jong Il or subordinates likely had knowledge. Again, given Kim Jong Il’s
absolute authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he and his cadres are
individually liable.
PERSECUTION: Article 7(2)(g) states: “‘Persecution’ means the intentional and
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the
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identity of the group or collectivity.”164 The non-context elements for Article 7(1)(h)
Crime against humanity of persecution are:
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more
persons of fundamental rights.
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a
group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law.
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7,
paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.165
This type of crime against humanity is reminiscent of genocide in that it encompasses
targeting of a group for certain inherent characteristics and requires special intent of that
targeting, but it allows for more possible grounds than genocide for the targeting, i.e.
political, cultural and gender grounds. The crime against humanity of persecution also
requires that the acts be at least one of the acts prohibited in Article 7(1) or a war crime
or genocide (as crimes under ICC jurisdiction), or must be ‘connected’ with such acts or
crimes, which is a more stringent requirement than under customary international law.166
In addition, of course, the crime against humanity of persecution has the context
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requirements of all crimes against humanity - knowledge and existence of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population.
Despite the more stringent requirements of connection to an ICC-jurisdiction
crime and special intent, clearly the DPRK situation meets the requirements for the crime
against humanity of persecution in many cases. This is not a surprising outcome for a
society that divides its entire population on essentially political grounds into core,
wavering, and hostile groups. Most of the 200,000 some prisoners in prison camps, who
were transferred to them without adequate due process, usually on grounds that were
political, including those who were imprisoned for merely being the relative of someone
who committed a political “crime,” fall within this category. In addition, as discussed
above for genocide, the targeting on national (and potentially ethnic) grounds in the case
of the half-Chinese babies and targeting on religious grounds in the case of the
Christians, also constitutes the crime against humanity of persecution if they were
knowingly conducted as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population. This conduct in the prison systems constitutes part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population of which Kim Jong Il or subordinates
likely had knowledge. They were connected to at least one of the acts prohibited in
Article 7(1) (e.g. imprisonment) or other crime (e.g. genocide) under ICC jurisdiction.
Again, given Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority and control, it is reasonable to believe he
and his cadres are individually liable.
The crime against humanity of persecution also likely occurs outside the prison
systems, particularly given the division of the entire society into the three loyaltydependent groups.
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ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS: Article 7(2)(i) states:
“Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.167
The non-context elements for Article 7(1)(i) Crime against humanity of enforced
disappearance of persons are:
1. The perpetrator:
(a) Arrested, detained or abducted one or more persons; or
(b) Refused to acknowledge the arrest, detention or abduction, or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons.
2. (a) Such arrest, detention or abduction was followed or accompanied by a refusal
to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of such person or persons; or
(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom.
3. The perpetrator was aware that:
(a) Such arrest, detention or abduction would be followed in the ordinary
course of events by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom
or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or
persons; or
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(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom.
4. Such arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization.
5. Such refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information
on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons was carried out by, or with
the authorization or support of, such State or political organization.
6. The perpetrator intended to remove such person or persons from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time. 168
The abductions by the DPRK are well-known and have particularly affected relations
between Japan and the DPRK. Since the end of the Korean War, the DPRK has
kidnapped thousands of ROK citizens and as many as 100 Japanese citizens.169 The
DPRK continues to order and carry out abductions. A Seoul-based NGO and Londonbased Amnesty International reported that Mr. Kang Gun, a defector from North Korea
who has South Korean citizenship, was kidnapped by the North Korean Security Agency
in March 2005 in China.170 On August 8, 2004, DPRK agents also kidnapped Ms. Jin
Kyung-sook, a former DPRK refugee and ROK passport holder.171 Other abductees still
held by the DPRK include 12 passengers from a hijacked Korean Air flight, hundreds of

168

See Elements of Crimes, supra note 75, at 122-123.

169

H. R. CON. RES. 168, supra note 41.

170

Kim Jong Il, Stop the Amoral Kidnapping Action Immediately!, citing the Daily Chosun, Sept. 9, 2005,

NKGULAG, DEMOCRACY NETWORK AGAINST NORTH KOREA GULAG,
http://www.nkgulag.org; Urgent Action North Korea: “Disappearance”/fear of torture/fear of death
penalty: Kang Gun, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 15, 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library.
171

H. R. CON. RES. 168, supra note 41.

69

ROK seamen and fishermen, and ROK Christian ministers. Credible sources report that
the DPRK may have abducted citizens from China, Europe and the Middle East. The
locations for these abductions possibly include the United Kingdom, Denmark,172
Lebanon, Thailand, Romania, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Jordan, Malaysia,
Singapore,173 and Spain, as well as ROK, Japan, and China. In addition, 7,034 ROK
citizens were abducted during the Korean War according to a 1956 survey by the Korean
National Red Cross and none were released.174 The ROK government estimates that
about 485 abducted ROK civilians are currently alive in the DPRK.175
The elements for this crime against humanity are met by these facts. DPRK
government agents abducted one or more persons, knowingly refused to provide
information on such persons and deprived them of their freedom and the protection of the
law for prolonged periods of time. The repeated conduct of kidnapping of persons
constitutes a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population of which Kim
Jong Il or subordinates likely had knowledge. The large number of civilian victims and
the apparent policy of the DPRK government to employ this tactic repeatedly indicate
such an attack. Kim Jong Il has already publicly acknowledged the abduction of 13
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Japanese citizens by his government’s agents.176 In addition, the ROK government
reported that the DPRK has admitted to holding 11 ROK civilians who were kidnapped
after the 1950-53 conflict.177 Again, given Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority and control,
it is reasonable to believe he and his cadres are individually liable.
OTHER INHUMANE ACTS: The non-context elements for Article 7(1)(k)
Crime against humanity of other inhumane acts are:
1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health, by means of an inhumane act.
2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 7,
paragraph 1, of the Statute.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the
character of the act.178
Given the pervasiveness and vicious character of crimes perpetrated by the Kim Jong Il
regime, it is prudent to include this category to cover any additional crimes that may
reveal themselves upon investigation. Examples may be medical experiments and testing
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of weapons of mass destruction materials on victims, although they may also fall under
the category of crimes against humanity for murder, extermination, torture, and if the
requisite special intent is present, persecution.

C. War crimes.

Article 8 War crimes states:
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of
such crimes.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely,
any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(i)

Wilful killing;

(ii)

Torture of inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments;

(iii)

Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health;

(iv)

Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;
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(v)

Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to
serve in the forces of a hostile Power;

(vi)

Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected
person of the rights of fair and regular trial;

(vii)

Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;

(viii) Taking of hostages.
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts: …
(vi)

Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid
down his arms or having no longer means of defence,
has surrendered at discretion. …

(x)

Subjecting persons who are in power of an adverse party

to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of
any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or
hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in
his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously
endanger the health of such person or persons…179
Prisoners of war from the Korean War, which was active from 1950-1953,180 are
tragically still imprisoned in the DPRK, in violation of Article III of the Korean War
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Armistice Agreement signed July 27, 1953,181 and the Geneva Convention relative to the
treatment of Prisoners of War.182
The ROK Ministry of National Defense estimates that 542 captives are still alive
in the DPRK, according to testimony given before the National Assembly in February
2005.183 They are protected persons pursuant to the Geneva Convention relative to the
treatment of Prisoners of War. Article 4 of this Convention states prisoners of war
include “Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces;”184 thus ROK soldiers as
members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict fall within this category. The Kim
Jong Il regime treats an unknown number of ROK prisoners of war abusively. For
example, they have been forced to perform hard labor for decades, often in mines, under
slave-like and lethal conditions.
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To determine which Article 8 provisions apply, we must determine whether the
Korean War was international or non-international. Kordic & Cerkez, based on the Tadic
appeal, sets forth criteria for this purpose.185 In the case of the armed conflict in BosniaHerzegovina, it considered first whether Croatia had intervened in the armed conflict
between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina through its
troops and second whether the HVO (Bosnian Croats) acted on behalf of Croatia. Either
situation was sufficient for a determination that the armed conflict was international.
Similarly, the interventions by the PRC and other states in the Korean conflict also
internationalized it. Thus Article 8(2)(a) and (b) are applicable.186 Given that the ROK
185
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(ii)

Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;

(iii)

Taking of hostages;

(iv)

The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constitutional court,
affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as
indispensable.
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prisoners of war who are abused likely suffer the same horrific conditions as other
detainees, we will not repeat a review of all the possible crimes again, this time under
Article 8 War Crimes. It must be noted that the ICC Statute’s Crimes against Humanity
provisions apply to civilians only, so the application of Article 8 War Crimes would be
necessary for a full analysis. We will consider, as an example, the Elements of Crimes
for the war crime of wilfully causing great suffering.
The elements for Article 8(2)(a)(iii) War crime of wilfully causing great
suffering:
1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious
injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that
protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict.187
Reports indicate that DPRK authorities have “caused great physical or mental pain or
suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of” ROK prisoners of war, who are
protected by the Geneva Conventions, despite knowing that they are ROK prisoners of
war. Again, Kim Jong Il is likely liable as a co-perpetrator, aider and abettor, or other

187

See Elements of Crimes, supra note 75, at 127.

76

form of participant, given the absolute control he possesses. As the chairman of the
People’s Army, he at a minimum likely bears individual responsibility as a commander
who failed to repress the commission of crimes committed by forces under his authority.
Article 28(a) states that a military commander:
shall be criminally responsible for crimes…committed by forces under
his…effective authority and control, …as a result of his…failure to exercise
control properly over such forces, where: (i) That military commander or person
either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that
the forces were committing…such crimes; and (ii) That military commander or
person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his … power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.188
The “should have known” standard makes meeting the requirements for culpability
potentially easier than that for superior authority under Article 28(b).189 In either case,
Kim Jong Il’s lack of knowledge is improbable, given his absolute control and
surveillance of the DPRK.
Regarding the last two elements, the Introduction to Article 8 War Crimes in the
Elements of Crimes states:
-There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the
existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or noninternational;
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-In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the
facts that established the character of the conflict as international or noninternational;
-There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took
place in the context of and was associated with.”190
These elements make clear that the determination of the Korean War as international or
non-international is irrelevant for the mens rea requirement. Obviously, detaining
someone known to be a ROK prisoner of war indicates an awareness of the existence of
the Korean War. Thus the five elements are met for the war crime of wilfully causing
suffering. Again, given Kim Jong Il’s absolute authority and control, it is reasonable to
believe he and his cadres are individually liable, as discussed previously.

VI. RECOMMENDATION.

The above analysis is intended to show with legal precision how facts in the
public domain from credible sources may form a “reasonable basis” for believing that
Kim Jong Il is legally liable for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.191
Of course, none of this proves “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Kim Jong Il is guilty of

190

See Elements of Crimes, supra note 75, at 125.

191

See ICC Statute, supra note 49, art. 53.

78

these crimes.192 But it certainly should raise questions as to what is being perpetrated in
the DPRK and compel the UN Security Council to inquire further to end the crimes.
The recent action concerning Darfur may be instructive as to how a case
concerning the DPRK might proceed. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the
Darfur Commission in October 2004. The Commission, headed by former ICTY judge
Antonio Cassese, reported to the UN in January 2005 that there was reason to believe that
crimes against humanity and war crimes had been committed in Darfur and
recommended that the situation be referred to the ICC.193 The Security Council made the
referral on March 31, 2005, by its Resolution 1593.194 After a preliminary analysis,
including the findings of the Commission, the Prosecutor decided on June 1, 2005, to
open an investigation into the situation in Darfur.195
Regarding the DPRK, the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General have
not effectively addressed its human rights violations. The UN Commission on Human
Rights, however, has appointed a Special Rapporteur for this purpose, in addition to
passing three resolutions condemning the DPRK’s human rights abuses.196 Thai law
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professor Vitit Muntarbhorn became the Special Rapporteur in July 2004. In his address
to the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 2005, he covered failures of the
DPRK regime in protecting the right to food and the right to life; the right to security of
the person, humane treatment, non-discrimination and access to justice; the right to
freedom of movement and protection of persons linked with displacement; the right to the
highest standards of health and the right to education; the right to selfdetermination/political participation, access to information, freedom of
expression/belief/opinion, association and religion; the rights of specific persons/groups:
women and children.
Unlike the Darfur Commission, he did not analyze abuses through the prism of
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. The DPRK also did not allow his
entry into the country, as Sudan allowed for the Darfur Commission. In addition, he did
not have a substantially large team of people to collect information to produce a 176-page
report, as the Darfur Commission did. Still, his findings are consistent with the many indepth reports that already exist on DPRK abuses. The Security Council, however, may
not be willing to refer a case to the ICC based on his findings or external reporting. The
Security Council did not choose to rely on the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Sudan. This indicates that a body more akin to the Darfur
Commission would be necessary. An International Commission of Inquiry on the DPRK,
with resulting investigation and recommendations, would likely be required to gain the
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votes of Security Council members (and abeyance of vetoes by the permanent members)
for a referral of the DPRK situation to the ICC.
The Darfur Commission itself was created by the Secretary-General at the request
of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII in its Resolution 1564.197 Permanent
Security Council members China and Russia abstained when the Council voted on this
resolution. It is unlikely that China would not veto a similar resolution for the DPRK,
unless the political climate changes significantly regarding the six-party-talks to end the
DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability or other changes occur, as discussed in Section III.
In an ideal world with a fully developed international legal system, political
timing would be irrelevant to initiating an investigation of an obviously suspect situation.
Although we are not at that stage, the existence of a mechanism to prosecute is still
highly useful. An investigation into the DPRK situation could be politically
advantageous at the appropriate time. Such could be the case if the six-party talks stalled
or, after a nuclear-arms-eliminating agreement is reached, if the DPRK violated it. The
Security Council may then be willing to request the Secretary-General to investigate the
DPRK human rights situation under its Chapter VII powers, in addition to condemning
the DPRK’s lack of cooperation regarding the nuclear issue. If the Security Council is
unable to produce a resolution for such a request, the Secretary-General should consider
investigating the DPRK human rights situation on his own initiative using a high-level
group of experts.198 The UN General Assembly could be another source of support for
197

S. C. Res. 1564, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/.

198

Article 99 of the UN Charter states that “the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security

Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”
The Secretary General has broad authority to appoint experts to address issues of concern. An example is

81

such an investigation. It recently passed its first resolution condemning DPRK human
rights abuses.199 The conclusions of such a high profile investigation would hopefully
influence the political climate in favor of stronger actions.
An International Commission of Inquiry on the DPRK may find that the ICC’s
temporal jurisdiction requirement is too restrictive for a referral of the DPRK case. It
may recommend that a special tribunal be created to reach crimes committed before July
1, 2002. This could cover famine and atrocity crimes that most significantly took place
since the mid-1990s. A special tribunal may also be more acceptable to the Bush
administration, which opposes the ICC.

However, creation of a new tribunal would

absorb time and resources that use of the existing ICC would not. In any case, the
Commission’s recommendation should include consideration of this issue.
Even if the DPRK abides by a future nuclear agreement, the Security Council
should ultimately refer the case to the ICC or if necessary, create a special tribunal for the
DPRK situation, for the sake of the persons suffering crimes against humanity, genocide,
and war crimes in the DPRK. That the DPRK would be no longer a threat in terms of
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nuclear weapons does not change the fact that it would still be perpetrating crimes that
must be unacceptable on their face. Given the inherent correctness of condemning crimes
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, the first steps on the path toward eventual
Security Council referral of the DPRK situation to the ICC or to a special tribunal should
be laid now to build the requisite political will.
The use of letters from states, such as the United Kingdom, to authorities in the
UN, such as the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General, could be one,
albeit small, step. A state could raise the topic of DPRK human rights under “Other
Business” during one of the daily Security Council meetings as another step, followed by
placement of the topic on a subsequent daily agenda with the support of other states. A
statement by the President of the Security Council could perhaps be on the path. Security
Council Resolutions that provide deadlines by which the DPRK must improve its human
rights situation are likely necessary steps, in addition to an investigation.200 Ideally, the
DPRK would genuinely meet these deadlines, but if not, then the political groundwork
should be in place to allow for a Security Council referral of the DPRK situation to the
ICC or the creation of a special tribunal to reach crimes prior to July 1, 2002.
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VII. CONCLUSION.

This article provides a factual overview of the crimes against humanity, genocide,
and war crimes that are being committed by the Kim Jong Il regime in the DPRK and
reviews the legal framework for their prosecution before the ICC. It applies this law to
facts from the public domain. It concludes that these facts provide a reasonable basis to
believe that Kim Jong Il is individually liable for such crimes. It shows that Kim Jong Il
is in control of the DPRK due to an ideology that elevates him to god-like status, thereby
placing him at the top of every governmental organ of power. He also maintains absolute
power by a system of surveillance and classification of the population based on loyalty.
Persons – and their relatives - are placed in prison camps of about 200,000 inmates
without adequate due process for alleged political crimes. They suffer enslavement and
frequent death by forced labor and starvation-level rations, in addition to torture,
beatings, rape, and other abuses. These abuses constitute crimes against humanity for
murder, extermination, enslavement, forcible transfer of population, arbitrary
imprisonment, torture, rape, and persecution on political and other grounds. Women and
girls who are trafficked to countries such as China may also suffer the crime against
humanity of enslavement. Some 80,000 persons are estimated to have died since, July 1,
2002, the date the ICC Treaty came into force. Millions have died prior to that date due
to the same crimes and famine.
In addition, persons who flee to China and are forcibly repatriated to the DPRK
face particularly brutal treatment in detention facilities. Those who are pregnant suffer
forced abortions or the murder of their infants upon birth because they are “half-
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Chinese.” Those who are Christian are also subject to particularly abusive punishment
because they are Christian. These crimes against national (and potentially ethnical) and
religious groups, as such, constitute genocide. In addition, the DPRK has abducted
thousands of South Koreans, Japanese, and others since the Korean War, with hundreds
still alive in captivity. These abductions constitute the crime against humanity of
enforced disappearance of persons. More than 500 South Korean prisoners of war are
also in DPRK captivity and may suffer abuses. These are war crimes. Of course, this is a
simplistic summary. Facts must be proven, crimes may overlap, and additional crimes
may emerge.
This article recommends that at the appropriate time in the near future, the UN
Secretary-General launch an investigation into DPRK abuses as he did for Darfur in the
Sudan. Such an investigation appears politically necessary to support a Security Council
referral of the DPRK situation to the ICC or, if the investigators find it necessary to
overcome the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction requirement, the creation of a special tribunal
to hear the case. While the current six-party talks for denuclearizing the DPRK make the
timing now for such an investigation difficult, this article contends that the possibility of
it may be beneficial to the talks, as it may prompt Kim Jong Il to be more cooperative. If
the DPRK refuses to cooperate in the six-party talks or if it reneges on any agreement
reached, UN Security Council action is likely. The Security Council should consider an
investigation and referral of the DPRK situation to the ICC or to a special tribunal as
seriously as it considers economic sanctions. The former targets the persons responsible
for the intransigence, in contrast to the bluntness of economic sanctions that punish
millions.

85

Admittedly, enforcement of arrest warrants against Kim Jong Il and his cadres
would be difficult, but that should not stop the legal efforts to have them issued. The
stigma of such a legal determination would be in itself potentially harmful. The political
situation may also change to allow for their use. Even if the DPRK cooperates in
reaching an agreement to denuclearize and in fact does so, the United Nations should
launch an investigation into DPRK abuses with the intent to refer the case to the ICC or
to a special tribunal. Such is necessary for the millions who suffer under the outrageous
regime of Kim Jong Il.
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